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KEEPING CIVIL RIGHTS DEBATES
CIVIL: REMOVING OPPORTUNITIES
FOR PREJUDICE
STEVEN SARACCO
INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom played a large role in the founding of the
United States of America and continues to be one of America’s key
tenets. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
1
exercise thereof.” Laws governing religious freedom and equality in
the United States, however, go beyond these First Amendment
prohibitions.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is one such attempt by
Congress to reinforce religious rights by forbidding employers from
discriminating against their employees or prospective employees on
2
the basis of religion. This statute extends the First Amendment’s
protections of religious minorities by prohibiting private employers
from discriminating against their employees and applicants on the
3
basis of religion.
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie &
4
Fitch, the Supreme Court will decide whether a job applicant bears
the burden of expressly notifying the employer of a conflict between
the applicant’s religious beliefs and the employer’s policies for the
employer to be required to make a reasonable accommodation under
5
Title VII. This seemingly routine question of statutory interpretation,
however, invokes much deeper issues of discrimination, equality,
 J.D. Candidate, Class of 2016, Duke University School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e).
3. See id.
4. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No.
14-86 (U.S. argued Feb. 25, 2015).
5. Id.
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religious freedom, and tolerance.
I. FACTS
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie) operates several
6
nationwide chains of clothing stores. Its flagship store, Abercrombie
& Fitch, is aimed at customers ages eighteen to twenty-two, and
7
Abercrombie Kids targets children ages eight to sixteen.
Abercrombie goes to great lengths to preserve and maintain its “East
8
Coast collegiate style,” and it is unusually selective for a retail store
9
in dictating the appearance of its employees.
First, rather than hire ordinary sales clerks to staff its retail
10
locations, Abercrombie hires “models” to perform sales functions. In
hiring these models, Abercrombie managers rate and hire applicants
based on different categories: “the applicant’s ‘appearance & sense of
style,’ whether the applicant is ‘outgoing & promotes diversity,’ and
11
whether he or she has ‘sophistication & aspiration.’” Applicants may
receive up to three points for each category, and must total six or
12
more points to be hirable. Additionally, an applicant must receive at
least two points in the appearance category, or else that applicant is
13
automatically removed from consideration. Second, Abercrombie
enforces a “Look Policy” on all models, containing specific rules on
14
grooming and dress. Specifically, the Look Policy does not allow
models to wear black clothing or “caps,” which Abercrombie
15
interprets to prohibit headscarves.
When she was seventeen years old, Samantha Elauf applied to
work as a “model” at the Abercrombie Kids store at Woodland Hills
16
Mall in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Elauf self-identifies as a Muslim and has
worn a hijab (or headscarf) for religious reasons since she was

6. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1275 (N.D. Okla.
2011) [hereinafter Abercrombie I].
7. Id.
8. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 2013)
[hereinafter Abercrombie II].
9. See Abercrombie I, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No.
14-86 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014).
11. Abercrombie II, 731 F.3d at 1113 (citation omitted).
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at 3.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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thirteen years old. Before her interview, Elauf asked a friend who
already worked at the store, Farisa Sepahvand, if models were allowed
18
to wear headscarves while working. Her friend asked Kalen
McJilton, a manager at the store, who stated “that he did not see any
19
problem” with headscarves, especially if the headscarf was not black.
20
Sepahvand relayed this information back to Elauf.
Elauf wore a black headscarf to her interview with assistant store
manager Heather Cooke, but was otherwise dressed in Abercrombie21
style clothing. The subject of Elauf’s religion did not arise during the
interview, but Cooke later stated that she assumed Elauf was Muslim,
22
and she assumed the headscarf was worn for religious purposes.
Cooke never mentioned the Look Policy by name during the
interview, nor did she mention that Abercrombie models are not
23
allowed to wear black clothing or caps.
Unsure about the headscarf, Cooke asked district manager
24
Randall Johnson for advice. Johnson told Cooke not to hire Elauf
25
because she wore a headscarf. Cooke pressed Johnson, telling him
26
that she believed the headscarf was worn for religious reasons.
Johnson told her that it did not matter, Elauf could not be hired
27
because the headscarf did not comport with the Look Policy. Elauf
28
had originally been given a “2” in all three categories. After their
discussion, Johnson instructed Cooke to reduce Elauf’s appearance
29
score to a “1” so that Abercrombie would not hire her. Cooke told
Elauf during the interview that she would call in the next day or two
30
to “let her know when orientation was.” Elauf never heard from
31
Cooke again. Three days after the interview, Sepahvand told Elauf
that Johnson instructed Cooke not to hire Elauf because of her

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Abercrombie I, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at 4.
Abercrombie I, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at 4–5.
Abercrombie I, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1279.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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32

Abercrombie has granted religious exemptions to its Look Policy
33
in the past; notably, Abercrombie has allowed Muslim employees to
34
wear headscarves. Since Elauf was rejected, Abercrombie has started
35
to allow more headscarf exceptions. Abercrombie has stated that it
makes every reasonable accommodation it can; however, it has also
stated that allowing Look Policy exceptions has a negative effect on
36
the store.
37
The EEOC, on behalf of Elauf, filed suit against Abercrombie.
The district court granted summary judgment to the EEOC. The court
based this decision on the prima facie case established in McDonnell
38
Douglas Corp. v. Green, discussed below.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Text and Purpose
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual,
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to [her]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
39
of such individual’s . . . religion.” “Religion” includes “all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief,” that an employer
is able to “reasonably accommodate . . . without undue hardship on
40
the conduct of the employer’s business.” Under Title VII, employers
must “reasonably accommodate the religious practices of an
employee or prospective employee, unless the employer demonstrates
that accommodation would result in undue hardship on the conduct
41
of its business.” The EEOC stresses that religion is a personal matter
and protection does not require affiliation with an established belief

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1280.
Id.
Abercrombie II, 731 F.3d at 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2014).
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(j).
29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b)(1)–(2) (2014).
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42

system.
The purpose of Title VII is to prohibit discrimination on the basis
43
of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Discrimination can
be shown when an employer engages in disparate treatment on the
44
basis of protected attributes. Disparate treatment occurs when an
employer acts with “discriminatory intent” in dealing with an
45
employee. Discriminatory intent, in turn, is found when an employer
discriminates based on a protected attribute, regardless of the
46
employer’s motivation.
B. Burden-Shifting Framework
On summary judgment, in a Title VII employment discrimination
47
case, a burden-shifting approach is used. Courts developed this
burden-shifting approach to provide plaintiffs and courts with a tool
for situations where there is only circumstantial evidence of
48
employment discrimination. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
the plaintiff claimed to be rejected from a job due to his race, based
on the facts that he was qualified and that defendant continued to
49
search for equally qualified employees after plaintiff’s rejection. The
Court decided that petitioners should be able to present a
discrimination case based on circumstantial evidence, after which the
50
defendant can present evidence to rebut.
Under McDonnell Douglas, initially, the plaintiff bears the burden
51
of establishing a prima facie case. This is met by producing evidence
(1) of a conflict between her bona fide religious belief and an
employer’s requirement; (2) that she informed the employer of this
52
belief; and (3) that employer declined to hire her due to the conflict.
If the plaintiff satisfies these elements, the burden shifts to the

42. EEOC Compl. Man. § 12-I(A)(1).
43. Brief for Petitioner at 19, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 14-86 (U.S.
Oct. 2, 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
44. Id. at 24 (citing Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n.15
(1977)).
45. Id. (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009)).
46. Id.
47. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
48. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 526 (1993).
49. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 805.
50. Id.
51. Abercrombie I, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1282 (citing Thomas v. Nat’l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000)).
52. Id.
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defendant who must “‘(1) conclusively rebut one or more elements of
the plaintiff’s prima facie case, (2) show that it offered a reasonable
accommodation, or (3) show that it was unable to accommodate the
53
employee’s religious needs reasonably without undue hardship.’”
The second element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case—that she
informed the employer of this belief—is interpreted differently in
different circuits. This issue was undecided in the Tenth Circuit prior
to this case. McDonnell Douglas does not specify whether the notice
given to the employer must be direct or whether it is enough for the
employer to simply know of the applicant’s religious beliefs. Prior to
this case, four circuit courts of appeals had decided that an explicit
notice requirement is too strict and would run contrary to the purpose
54
of Title VII.
C. EEOC Guidance
The EEOC has provided guidance on when an employer has an
obligation to provide an accommodation. Such guidance states that an
employer has an obligation to make an accommodation “[a]fter an
employee or prospective employee notifies the employer . . . of his or
55
her need for a religious accommodation.” The EEOC compliance
manual similarly states that “an applicant or employee who seeks
religious accommodation must make the employer aware both of the
need for accommodation and that it is being requested due to a
56
conflict between religion and work.” Because Congress has not
spoken directly to the notice requirement of Title VII, courts are
57
likely to defer to the EEOC’s interpretation.
III. HOLDING
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and
granted summary judgment for Abercrombie. The court of appeals
concluded that Title VII’s notice requirements are only met when
58
explicit notice of a conflict is given by the applicant to the employer.
53. Id. (quoting Thomas, 225 F.3d at 1156).
54. Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 450 (7th Cir. 2013); Dixon v.
Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 856 (11th Cir. 2010); Brown v. Polk Cnty., 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th
Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1158 (1996); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433,
1439 (9th Cir. 1993).
55. Id. at 1135 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1) (2014)).
56. Id. (quoting EEOC Compl. Man. § 12–IV(A)(1)).
57. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
58. Abercrombie II, 731 F.3d at 1122–23.
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It is not enough for the employer to have knowledge of the conflict
from another source, nor is it enough for the employer to infer a
59
potential conflict from any interaction with the employee. Rather,
the plaintiff must establish that he or she expressly informed the
employer of a conflict between his or her religion and the employer’s
60
work rule, thereby requiring an accommodation.
The court of appeals used a number of different arguments to
61
reach this conclusion. First, it looked at the Tenth Circuit’s
62
precedent. The court found that Thomas v. National Association of
63
Letter Carriers placed the burden on the applicant to inform the
64
employer.
Second, the court considered the realities of the hiring process,
particularly the information that is ordinarily available to the parties
65
involved. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized that, often,
the only way for an employer to know an applicant’s religious beliefs
66
is for the applicant to expressly inform the employer. Without this
express notice, it would be impractical to expect an employer to make
67
an accommodation. Even if an employer can infer that an applicant
subscribes to an organized religion, the applicant’s beliefs are still an
68
individual choice and may differ from what the employer expects.
Further, the applicant likely has a better understanding of those
beliefs, what the commitments required are, and what kind of
69
accommodation would be necessary.
Third, the court of appeals looked to the EEOC’s guidance, which
states that an employer has an obligation to make an accommodation
“[a]fter an employee or prospective employee notifies the
70
employer . . . of his or her need for a religious accommodation.” The
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1123.
62. Id.
63. Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000).
64. See Abercrombie II, 731 F.3d at 1123 (“[W]e construe our own precedent (by its plain
terms) as placing the burden on applicants or employees.”).
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1133 (“[O]rdinarily, the only way the employer would know such information
is if the applicant or employee informed the employer.”).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 1133–34 (explaining that an employee or applicant may not consider his
religious practice inflexible, so the employer would not need to provide a reasonable
accommodation).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1135 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1) (2014)).
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court also noted that the EEOC compliance manual requires
applicants to “make the employer aware both of the need for
accommodation and that it is being requested due to a conflict
71
between religion and work.”
72
Judge Ebel concurred in part and dissented in part. Judge Ebel
agreed that it was a mistake for the district court to grant summary
judgment, but he rejected the explicit verbal notice requirement
73
endorsed by the majority. While the applicant will have a better
understanding of his or her religious requirements, the employer’s
knowledge of the work rules may give the employer superior
74
knowledge and awareness of a potential conflict. Judge Ebel
observes this case is an example of when the employer had better
75
knowledge of a conflict than the applicant.
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. EEOC’s Arguments
1. The plain meaning of Title VII, the precedent, and Congress’s
clear intent refute the Tenth Circuit’s decision.
The EEOC begins with the text of Title VII, pointing out that the
statute makes it unlawful for an employer to reject a job applicant
based on his or her religion, unless the employer can demonstrate that
76
an accommodation would constitute an undue hardship.
“Religion . . . includes all aspects of religious observance and
77
practice.” This language easily applies to a situation, such as the one
at bar, where an employer chooses not to hire an individual after
78
learning of her religious practice. It is unlikely that Abercrombie’s
accommodation of Elauf’s headscarf would constitute an undue
hardship, especially considering that Abercrombie had previously

71. Id. (quoting EEOC Compl. Man. § 12–IV(A)(1)).
72. Id. at 1143 (Ebel, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Id.
74. See id. at 1144 (explaining that Abercrombie did know there might be a potential
conflict).
75. Id.
76. Brief for Petitioner at 22–23, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 44
(Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 14-86) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2014)).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 23 (“[T]he language of this prohibition easily reaches cases in which an
employer declines to hire someone based on what it correctly understands to be a religious
practice.”).
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made
accommodations
for
headscarves
under
identical
79
circumstances.
The purpose of Title VII is to prohibit discrimination on the basis
80
of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Applying court
81
precedent, disparate treatment occurs when an employer makes an
82
employment decision based on a religious practice of an employee.
Disparate treatment is exactly what Title VII aims to prohibit and is
83
exactly what happened to Elauf.
The EEOC argues that Supreme Court precedent supports this
84
interpretation of Title VII and decries any attempt to narrow it. The
Court has declared that Title VII “must be given a liberal
interpretation” to achieve its broad goals of “prohibit[ing] and
85
remedy[ing] discrimination.” The Tenth Circuit has ignored this
guidance and narrowed the scope of Title VII, diluting the statute’s
potency.
The Supreme Court has also found that one of Congress’s main
purposes in enacting Title VII was to focus employers’ decisions solely
on the merits of employees and applicants, removing biases from the
86
process. The Court found that religion, among other factors, is
unrelated to work qualification and should not be a factor in the
87
hiring process. The EEOC contends that the Tenth Circuit’s decision
does not comport with this objective because it allows employers to
reject applicants based solely on religion, as long as notice of that
88
religion does not come from the applicant’s own admission.
Similarly, Congress’s goal of bilateral cooperation suffers under
89
the Tenth Circuit’s decision. In enacting Title VII, Congress realized
that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to civil rights. Congress
hoped that Title VII would encourage dialogue between employers

79. See Abercrombie I, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1279–1280 (discussing prior instances of
accommodations for headscarves).
80. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 43, at 19.
81. Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000).
82. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 43, at 24.
83. See id. (“[T]he employer has engaged in the type of disparate-treatment discrimination
at the heart of Title VII's prohibitions.”).
84. Id. at 24–25.
85. See id. (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 80–81 (1982)).
86. See id. at 25 (“By enacting Title VII, Congress sought to eliminate decision-making
based on particular aspects of identity that Congress deemed unrelated to merit.”).
87. See id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 n.6 (1977)).
88. Id. at 26.
89. Id. at 26–27.
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and employees, so that each individual situation could be resolved in
90
the best way to meet both parties’ needs. The Tenth Circuit’s
decision creates incentives for employers that run contrary to
91
Congress’s objectives. If an employer learns of a conflict from a
source other than the applicant, that employer is suddenly
disincentivized to continue with the hiring process for that individual
because the employer knows it may lead to the need for an
92
accommodation. Applicants wearing clothing indicative of minority
religious groups may well never get past the first stage of the process,
prior to which they might not have had the opportunity to disclose
93
their need for an accommodation.
2. The Tenth Circuit’s justifications do not warrant its narrow
application of Title VII.
On reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit relied on the language
underlying the burden-shifting framework developed from
94
McDonnell Douglas. In doing so, the court of appeals gave its
95
reading of McDonnell Douglas greater weight than the statute itself.
The EEOC points out that “burden-shifting frameworks do not
96
impose requirements beyond those in the statute.” Rather, they
provide an organized way to examine the evidence as it pertains to
97
the law. Thus the court of appeals overextended itself by favoring the
rigid enforcement of the burden-shifting framework over the plain
98
meaning and Congressional intent of the statute.
The EEOC also refutes the court’s reasoning that explicit notice is
necessary because the applicant has superior knowledge of his or her
99
religious needs. While this assertion by the court is likely often
100
accurate, it ignores an equally large imbalance of information. That
is, the employer will always know more about its own policies than
101
the applicant will, especially at the first interview. It is thus
90. Id.
91. Id. at 27 (describing the incentives created as a result of this decision).
92. Id.
93. See id. at 27–28 (explaining that employers could decline to hire applicants based on
perceived religious practices).
94. See id. at 28.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 29.
97. See id. (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.

SARACCO 3.31.15 - FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/10/2015 1:18 PM

137

KEEPING CIVIL RIGHTS DEBATES CIVIL
102

unreasonable to place the entire burden on the applicant.
Lastly, the EEOC looks to EEOC guidance, arguing that it
103
requires more deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. than the
104
court of appeals gave it. The EEOC guidance rejects an explicit,
direct notice requirement, and the EEOC contends that this should
105
direct the court’s decision.
B. Abercrombie’s Arguments
Abercrombie first claims that EEOC must establish that
Abercrombie intentionally discriminated against Elauf on the basis of
106
her religion. Abercrombie contends that its denial of employment—
107
brought on by its work rule—did not have a discriminatory motive.
108
Rather, it merely had a discriminatory effect. While Title VII does
prohibit some discriminatory effects in addition to all events involving
109
discriminatory motives,
it only requires employers to make
110
accommodations when doing so does not cause an undue hardship.
Here, adjusting the work rule would cause an undue hardship because
111
it is central to Abercrombie’s branding and sales. By denying an
112
exemption, Abercrombie did not intentionally discriminate.
Abercrombie next points to the EEOC’s guidelines. The
guidelines recognize that religion is a personal and sometimes
113
sensitive topic. To maintain an atmosphere of comfort and tolerance,
the guidelines discourage employers from inquiring into applicants’
114
religious beliefs. Similarly, they state that it is preferable for an
employee to ask for an accommodation, rather than for an employer
115
to guess.
102. Id.
103. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
104. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 43, at 30–31.
105. Id. at 31–33.
106. See Brief for Respondent at 1, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
44 (Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 14-86) (“The EEOC claims that Abercrombie thereby engaged in
intentional religious discrimination under Title VII.”).
107. See id. (describing Abercrombie’s religion-neutral dress and grooming standards).
108. Id.
109. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
110. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 106, at 4 (describing requirement to make
accommodations when it does not cause undue hardship).
111. See id. at 6–7 (explaining the importance of strong brands for retailer success).
112. See id. at 21 (arguing that denial of an exemption to a neutral rule is not
discrimination).
113. Id. at 30.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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Abercrombie concludes that it had no choice but to decline to hire
Elauf, who followed neither of the two paths available to her: comply
with Abercrombie’s Look Policy or request a religious
116
accommodation. This type of situation, Abercrombie continues, is
117
why a direct explicit notice requirement is necessary to Title VII. As
someone with significant enough interest in Abercrombie’s store to
apply for a job there, Elauf is very likely to observe that they have a
Look Policy, even if she cannot detect what the exact requirements
118
are. It is much less likely that one of Abercrombie’s managers will
119
be familiar with the religions of every applicant interviewed.
V.

ANALYSIS

Based on the text of Title VII and the Tenth Circuit’s precedent,
Abercrombie has a compelling case at first glance. Title VII requires
an applicant or employee to “inform” their employer, thereby placing
the onus on the one requesting an accommodation. Requiring explicit
notice directly from the applicant or employee is the strictest
interpretation of this language, but it is not the only valid
interpretation. There is also an element of impracticality involved in
requiring employers to make accommodations when they have no
reason to know of that accommodation. For that reason, the explicit
notice rule outlined by the Tenth Circuit has merit.
The Court, however, should also look to Congress’s intent in
passing the statute in determining the best interpretation of “inform.”
An analysis of Congressional intent sways this case in favor of
Petitioner. Congress’s stated goal of preventing discrimination in the
workplace can only be fully achieved with a broader interpretation of
the notice rule. An explicit notice rule leaves too many doors open for
unethical employers to deny employment on prejudicial grounds,
meanwhile placing the burden of proving their prejudice on the
injured party.
Given the facts in this case, it runs contrary to Congress’s
conception of civil rights to allow Abercrombie to base its hiring
decision on any consideration of Elauf’s religion, as it admittedly did.
The purpose of Title VII is to require employers to focus only on the
applicant’s merits. Based on Cooke’s scores of Elauf in the three
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id. at 9–10 (describing Elauf’s options).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
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categories, Elauf was qualified for the model position she applied for.
The factor that caused Abercrombie not to hire Elauf was her
religious practice of wearing a headscarf.
While it is true that Abercrombie’s Look Policy is neutral and
does not discriminate, Abercrombie fails to defend against
discrimination in this particular instance. Abercrombie accurately
states that Elauf never requested an accommodation and argues that
giving Elauf an accommodation was therefore impossible. More
relevant, however, is that Elauf was never given the opportunity to
request an accommodation, and this absence of opportunity
originated from Abercrombie’s understanding of her religion. No
official representative of Abercrombie explained the portion of the
Look Policy that might conflict with Elauf’s beliefs, despite clear and
recognized evidence that a conflict existed. Instead, the store simply
refused to hire her without explanation, knowing that, if it hired her, it
would have to provide an accommodation.
This issue—and this case, in particular—comes at a time when
religious discrimination poses a renewed problem for American
society. A recent survey shows that Americans are growing
120
increasingly concerned about workplace discrimination. Since the
attacks of September 11, 2001, anti-Muslim sentiment has increased in
121
the United States. Fifty-two percent of Americans say that Western
122
society does not respect Muslims. Muslims are more likely than
members of any other religious groups to report facing racial or
religious discrimination in the past year, at a concerning rate of 48
123
percent. Much of this anti-Muslim sentiment results from a lack of
124
knowledge about Islam. Considering this fact in light of Congress’s
wish that Title VII would encourage communication between
applicants and employers, it becomes especially important to ensure
that the doorway to conversation remains open. It is thus especially
important for the Court—as the neutral protector of minority rights—
to step in and enforce the rights granted by Title VII for all
120. TANENBAUM CTR. FOR INTERRELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING, WHAT AMERICAN
WORKERS REALLY THINK ABOUT RELIGION: TANENBAUM’S 2013 SURVEY OF AMERICAN
WORKERS AND RELIGION 5 (2013), available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/bpen9b7pks/$File/2013TanenbaumWorkplaceAndReligionSurveyEmail.pdf.
121. Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West, GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslim-sentimentwest.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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Americans.
CONCLUSION
This is a difficult question for the Court with strong arguments on
both sides. The Court’s hand should ultimately be tipped by
Congress’s intent in enacting Title VII: to prevent discrimination in
the workplace based on irrelevant factors such as religion. This is
exactly the type of discrimination that occurred here, and the Court
should take this opportunity to reverse the court of appeals and
create a rule that better serves Title VII’s objectives.

